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The Self-Exiled Class 
by David Matas 
Events in Eastern Europe are forc- 
ing the West to rethink a whole range 
of policies. The Cold War froze into a 
fixed configuration a wide panorama 
of Western policies - not just in 
defense and international affairs, not 
just in economics, but in immigration 
as well. 
Now that the Cold War has 
thawed, that Eastern Europe is draw- 
ing aside the Iron Curtain, that the 
Berlin wall has ceased to be a barrier, 
the West has to re-examine the policies 
that were generated by the Cold War. 
The West has been slow to react to 
what is going on in Eastern Europe, 
and, within the West, Canada has been 
one of the slowest. 
Though the underlying facts that 
led to current policies have changed, 
the policies continue. Some of this 
continuation may simply be caution 
because of uncertainty of the lasting 
nature of the changes. 
However, where caution is the 
explanation, that caution is misplaced. 
We in the West cannot remain indiffer- 
ent to what is happening in Eastern 
Europe. 
The changes are positive changes. 
The developments are ones we in the 
West would want to encourage. By 
remaining fixed in old policy stands 
waiting to see if the changes will last, 
we are doing nothing to help the 
changes last. If we really want to see 
the East change, the West must change 
itself. 
Another explanation is bureaucrat- 
ic inertia, the comfort of old ways. 
Once a policy is in place, laws are 
passed, officers are appointed to 
administer it, forms are printed, 
instructions are issued, the path of 
least resistance is just to carry on. The 
people who administer a policy may 
have fogotten why it was instituted. 
They may have never known in the 
first place. 
The options that were canvassed 
and rejected at the time a policy deci- 
sion was made drop from sight. Laws 
and policies do not come with 
explanations. 
The 
self-exiled class 
was there 
not 
just to protect 
those victimized 
by exit controls, 
but 
to allow 
immigration from 
Eastern Europe, 
by 
circumventing 
exit controls. 
When these policies date from 
decades past, the reasons for them 
become matters of historical research, 
rather than common knowledge. 
There are also vested interests. 
Although the Cold War was not in the 
public interest, many individuals 
benefitted from it. Their vested inter- 
ests are a political voice, a pressure 
group to carry on with these out of 
date policies. 
All that is true of the self-exiled 
class. The self-exiled class is a class 
within our immigration law that is a 
carryover from the Cold War. 
Structurally, it appears ideologically 
neutral. A person falls within the self- 
exiled class if he is from a country in a 
list chosen by Cabinet. He must be 
outside that country, outside of 
Canada, and able to demonstrate he 
can successfully establish in Canada. 
Successful establishment can be done 
by sponsorship by a corporation or a 
group of five or more individuals. 
What makes the class ideologically 
explicit is the countries that have been 
designated. The countries on the list 
are Albania, Romania, the GDR, 
Czechoslavakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland, and the USSR. All the coun- 
tries behind the disintegrating Iron 
Curtain are there. And no others are. 
Since the class was first instituted 
other countries have shown up on the 
list briefly, from time to time. Cuba 
was there for a while. So was Haiti. 
But only the Sovietdominated Eastern 
Europe countries were on the list from 
the start till the present. 
Yugoslavia, which historically has 
been as Communist and as repressive 
as the rest of Eastern Europe, but has 
not been Soviet dominated, is not on 
the list. A person who is in Yugoslavia 
cannot apply to come to Canada as 
part of the self-exiled class. But a per- 
son from Yugoslavia, outside of 
Yugoslavia, also cannot come to 
Canada as part of the self-exiled class. 
The self-exiled class is one group 
under the designated class category of 
the Immigration Act which provides 
for the admission of that designated 
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class in accordance with Canada's 
humanitarian tradition with respect to 
the displaced and persecuted. In other 
words, people from Eastern European 
countries in the list to qualify for self- 
exiled status and outside of Eastern 
Europe are considered displaced and 
persecuted. 
The self-exiled class is not unique. 
But it is virtually unique. There is one 
other designated class like it - the 
Indochinese designated class. This 
class, like the self-exiled class, is a class 
of people outside listed countries, out- 
side of Canada and able to demon- 
strate they can successfully establish in 
Canada. The countries in this class are 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, again 
all Communist countries. 
Why does the self-exiled class 
exist? What was the logic behind its 
establishment? It cannot be just that 
Eastern Europeans were displaced and 
persecuted. Regretfully, displacement 
and persecution are not unique to 
Eastern Europe and South East Asia. 
They exist in many more places 
besides. 
There are two alternative explana- 
tions I can suggest for the existence of 
the self-exiled class. One is policy. 
The other is politics. The political 
explanation is anti-Communism. 
Calling anyone who leaves Eastern 
Europe persecuted is a form of con- 
demnation of governments of the 
countries of Eastern Europe. It is an 
attempt to discredit these govern- 
ments. It extracts valued manpower 
from these countries, weakening their 
economies. 
Yugoslavia is excluded from the 
class precisely because it is not now 
and was not Soviet-dominated. Since 
Soviet Communism was the enemy, it 
was only the Soviets and their satel- 
lites that Canada wished to condemn 
as persecutors. 
Much the same can be said of the 
Indochinese designated class. Canada 
does not even recognize the current 
government of Cambodia. China, 
which is every bit as repressive as 
Indochina, is not on the list because 
Canada has come, politically, to accept 
the government in China. The desire 
to discredit and condemn is not as 
deep and fervent. 
The policy explanation is a desire 
to provide relief from severe exit con- 
trols. One feature of totalitarian 
Communist governments is that leav- 
ing the country without permission is 
a crime. The right to leave any coun- 
try, including one's own, is a funda- 
mental human right. It is a right that 
has been systematically violated in 
Eastern Europe. People who may 
have been in no danger of persecution 
before departure become subject to 
persecution simply because they have 
... the rationale 
for 
the inclusion 
of many 
of the countries 
of Eastern Europe 
in the 
self-exiled class 
has 
disappeared. 
left without permission. A person 
who has left, without permission, a 
country with severe exit controls 
becomes by that very fact a 
pmumptive refugee. 
The name of the class suggests this 
rationale. A person who leaves with- 
out permission a country with severe 
exit controls is selfexiled. He knows 
that once he has left he cannot return, 
except to persecution. He has 
nowhere else to go. 
The desire to provide relief from 
exit controls is not just humanitarian 
in nature. There is an immigration 
component built into the policy. 
Although &gees and immigrants are 
conceptually distinct, the Government 
of Canada jumbles the two together, 
particularly for refugees seeking reset- 
tlement from abroad. 
A person from a country with 
severe exit controls cannot immigrate 
to Canada in the normal way. The per- 
son must first leave his or her country 
for some other reason than a desire to 
immigrate to Canada and then seek 
immigration to Canada from a third 
country. Once Eastern Europe had 
severe exit controls, if Canada were to 
have any immigration at all from 
Eastern Europe, something like the 
self-exiled class was necessary. The 
self-exiled class was there not just to 
protect those victimized by exit con- 
trols, but to allow immigration from 
Eastern Europe, by circumventing exit 
controls. 
For the purpose of deciding what 
to do now with the self-exiled class, it 
does not really matter which of these 
rationales is the real one, the better 
one. No matter which purpose is the 
proper one, the wality is that both are 
out of date. Because of glasnost and 
perestroika, the disintegration of the 
Iron Curtain and the ending of the 
Cold War, the rationale for the self- 
exiled class has disappeared. Or, at the 
very least, the rationale for the inclu- 
sion of many of the countries of 
Eastern Europe in the self-exiled class 
has disappeared. 
There is no reason to suggest that 
~o man ia*  or Albania should be 
removed from the self-exiled class. 
But for every other member of the 
class, one has to ask why they are still 
there. 
Hungary and Poland have no exit 
controls. A Hungarian law passed by 
the legislature on September 26, 1989 
to take effect on January 1, 1990, says 
"It is the fundamental right of 
Hungarian citizens to choose their 
place of residence freely, to emigrate 
* This article was written before the events 
that led to the fall of Ceaucescu and the 
subsequent political opening in Romania 
took place. (ed. note) 
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from Hungary ....'I Not free to leave 
are those in possession of state secrets 
of special importance to the national 
defense. They must give up their pbs 
in which they have learned of the 
secrets, and wait three years. Also not 
free to leave are those on trial for seri- 
ous crimes, or under a suspended 
sentence, and those who avoid taxes. 
The Czech government announced 
on November 14, 1989 that Czechs 
would no longer need exit visas to 
travel to the West. East Germany has 
relaxed its exit rules. The Supreme 
Soviet legislature gave preliminary 
approval to a bill on November 13, 
1989, that allows emigration for almost 
anyone who has entry permission 
from another country, no outstanding 
alimony obligations, criminal charges 
or recent knowledge of state secrets. 
The law formalizes changes that have 
been put in practice already. 
These changes do not remove all 
impediments to travel from Eastern 
Europe. The Czech government has 
prevented the travel of prominent dis- 
sidents by confiscating passports. 
Eastern Europeans may also have so 
little foreign currency that leaving is 
impractical. 
However, the danger that used to 
exist simply from leaving without per- 
mission has, by and large, gone. And 
with it has gone the reason for the 
existence of the self-exiled class. 
Yet, instead of the Government of 
Canada's decreasing admissions from 
the class, it is moving in exactly the 
opposite direction. The Government 
of Canada is increasing government 
sponsored admissions to Canada from 
the self-exiled class. 
Admission to Canada of refugees 
and members of the designated class 
comes through government sponsor- 
ship and private sponsorship. 
Private sponsorship is numerically 
unlimited. It is limited only by the 
willingness and capacity of the private 
sector to sponsor and the willingness 
of the Government to recognize spon- 
sored candidates as refugees. 
Government sponsorship, on the 
other hand, is strictly limited. Each 
year the Government sets quotas, 
overall around the world, by region, 
and locally by visa office. 
The latest levels report was pre- 
sented to Parliament by the Minister of 
Employment and Immigration on 
October 18,1989. The report noted an 
increase in the government-assisted 
refugee allocation for Eastern Europe 
to 3500 from 3,400. Although the lev- 
els q o r t  calls the allocation a refugee 
allocation, the allocation includes peo- 
ple from the self-exiled class whether 
they meet the refugee definition or not. 
The reason for the increase? 
According to the levels report it is that 
the relaxation of exit countries from 
The 
Government 
is 
trading off 
real refugees 
for people 
who may 
not meet 
the 
refugee defintion 
at all. 
Eastern Europe has resulted in an 
increased number of Eastern 
Europeans seeking third country reset- 
tlement. In other words because the 
reason for the class is disappearing, 
the Government will increase 
sponsorship from the class. 
The response is not only illogical. 
It is imposing hardship on real 
refugees. The overall government- 
assisted planned refugee allocation 
remained the same from 1989 to 1990 
at 13,000. When one category goes up, 
another goes down. For 1990, the 
categories that went down are dugees 
from Latin America, from 3,400 to 
3,000 and from the Middle East and 
West Asia, from 1,800 to 1,700. People 
from Latin America and the Middle 
East within the government quota are 
real refugees, who have to meet the 
refugee definition. There is nothing 
like the self-exiled class for Latin 
America or the Middle East. The 
Government is trading off real 
refugees for people who may not meet 
the ~ f u g e e  defintion at all. 
The ending of exit controls does 
not mean that there are no longer 
refugees from Eastern Europe. The 
Communist party remains in power 
everywhem. In Poland, Solidarity has 
the Premier's office and several 
Cabinet posts. But the police, the mili- 
tary, the presidency are still 
Communist. In Hungary, the 
Communist party has changed its 
name. But many of the people in posi- 
tions of power remain the same. 
Repression has lifted. But it has, by no 
means, disappeared. 
The United Sates, for Eastern 
Europe, has gone from one extreme to 
another. 
Originally the US had something 
like the self-exiled class for Soviets 
alone, presuming them to be l~fugees 
once they had left the Soviet Union, 
and provided for their resettlement in 
the US. In September, 1988 the US 
started imposing mfugee screening on 
these Soviet exiles. Those who did not 
meet the refugee definition were 
denied entry to the US. 
In September of this year, the US 
announced that Soviet refugees must 
apply in the American embassy in 
Moscow. They could no longer apply, 
as they had in the past, in Rome and 
Vienna. The change will have the 
effect of cutting down the numbers of 
those who can qualify as refugees. 
Refugees cannot feel secure in 
telling their stories in the country of 
persecution. 
As well, refugee assistance p u p s  
who have assisted Soviet claimants in 
Rome and Vienna have not been 
allowed to do similar work in the 
Soviet Union. Before the policy 
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change the denial rate of Soviet 
claimants in Moscow was 54 per cent, 
and in Rome, 20 per cent. 
The Americans have a government 
refugee quota, as does Canada. But 
there is nothing equivalent to 
Canadian private sponsorship. So, 
once the US quota is filled, no more 
refugees can enter. Even for those who 
have a well founded fear of 
persecution, if they are beyond US 
quota numbers, the US will not offer 
protection. 
For Hungarians and Poles seeking 
US protection the situation is even 
more difficult. The current US posi- 
tion is that it will not consider Poles or 
Hungarians for refugee resettlement 
unless they face immediate threats to 
their lives, have relatives in the US or 
have exceptionally strong ties to the 
us. 
Poles and Hungarians are pre- 
sumed not to be refugees. For Poles 
and Hungarian that US position was 
announced on November 21, 1989. 
That shift, I believe, goes too far. It 
ignores the reality of repression that 
continues to exist, albeit not as system- 
atically as before, in Eastern Europe. 
Canada's response to the refugee 
situation in Eastern Europe has been 
essentially political. The Government 
has welcomed refugees from Eastern 
Europe, easily and freely, not just for 
humanitarian reasons but as well 
because it was a form of discrediting, 
of undermining Eastern European 
regimes. 
There is a danger that when the 
response shifts, the shift will be equal- 
ly political. I believe the West should 
do what it can to encourage the 
changes in Eastern Europe that are 
occurring. But that should not mean 
denying protection to real refugees. 
Because finding a person to be a 
refugee means finding that the person 
has a well-founded fear of persecution, 
a refugee determination is a 
persecution determination. Deciding a 
person is a refugee means deciding his 
government is persecuting him. A 
refugee determination is a form of crit- 
icism, a discrediting of the government 
of the country fled. 
Now that repression in Eastern 
Europe is lifting, there is a temptation 
to avoid criticism. 
When matters are getting better, 
criticism allows Communist reac- 
tionaries to argue that no change will 
satisfy the West. Criticism undercuts 
the reformers who are the agents for 
change. 
Politically, it may make sense to 
emphasize the positive in Eastern 
European developments, rather than 
focus on negative vestiges of the past 
that continue. 
Refugees should not, however, be 
held hostage to this sort of politics. 
Real refugees should be recognized as 
refugee 
determination 
is 
a form 
of criticism, 
discrediting 
of the government 
of the 
country fled. 
such even if the implications of the 
recognition is a criticism of a regime 
that, politically, the Government of 
Canada wishes to encourage. 
Keeping the self-exiled class is not 
necesary to maintain protection for 
refugees from Eastern Europe. 
Protection could continue as long as 
those leaving Eastem Europe are eligi- 
ble to apply under the standard 
Canadian refugee resettlement 
procedures. 
I do not suggest Canada decrease 
admissions from Eastern Europe. 
Indeed there may be justification for 
increasing admissions. 
It is ironic that the greatest recent 
Eastern European outflow, from East 
Germany, is not even eligible under the 
self-exiled class. West Germany con- 
siders East Germans in West Germany 
as West German nationals. Because 
these East Germans, once they enter 
West Germany, become West German 
nationals, they are not eligible to apply 
under the self-exiled class. 
There was a lot of fanfare recently 
when the German Canadian Congress 
signed a sponsorship umbrella agree- 
ment with the Canadian Government, 
allowing the Congress to sponsor East 
Germans within the self-exiled class. 
That agreement may, however, mean 
little if the self-exiled class continues in 
its present form. The bulk of the East 
Germans who left for West Germany 
are simply not eligible. 
Those leaving Poland, Hungary, 
the Soviet Union, the GDR, 
Czechoslavakia and Bulgaria should 
not be presumed to be refugees simply 
because they have left their home 
countries. 
These countries should be 
removed from the self-exiled class. 
Denying the presumption that those 
leaving most Eastern European coun- 
tries should be presumed to be 
refugees still leaves open the question 
of how to handle admissions from 
Eastern Europe. In any case, any 
increase in the welcome Canada offers 
to East Europeans should not be at the 
expense of those fleeing a well found- 
ed fear of persecution. 
David Matas is chair of the Working 
Group on Overseas Protection of the 
Canadian Council for Refugees. T h e  
remarks contained in this article were 
presented to the Canadian Council for 
ReJkgees in Montreal on November 25, 
1989. David Matas is also the author, 
together with Zlana Simon, 4 Closing the 
Doors: The Failure of Refugee 
Protection in Canada (Toronto: 
Sumwhi l l  Press, 1990). 
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A Continuing Growth 
The Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB) received nearly half as 
many claims during the first quarter of 
1990 as it did during all of 1989. 
In its first quarterly report, the IRB 
revealed that it received 5,987 cases 
from January 1 to March 31. This com- 
pared with 13,537 claims for all of 
1989. 
Rates of acceptance at the full 
hearing stage have dropped signifi- 
cantly for a number of countries (par- 
ticularly Eastern European countries, 
reflecting the rapidly changing domes- 
tic conditions there). But in the case of 
the six largest source countries (Sri 
Lanka, Somalia, China, Iran, El 
Salvador and Lebanon) these rates 
have remained at over 70 per cent. For 
three of them (Iran, Somalia and Sri 
Lanka), they remain at over 90 per 
cent. 
In spite of the Board's increasing 
productivity (the month of March was 
the best in IRB history, with 735 full 
hearings completed) the new backlog 
or "frontlog" has continued to grow. 
IRB Chairman Gordon Fairweather 
anticipates further improvements 
based on additional streamlining 
methods in dealing with claims. 
The Chairman recalled that the 
IRB, which began operations on 
January 1,1989, was structured to pro- 
cess a.n expected 18,000 Convention 
refugee claimants annually. But he 
noted that a striking increase in claims 
has taken place since the last quarter of 
1989, which could push the 1990 
caseload to 40,000 claims. 
During the first quarter of 1990, 
considering both initial and full hear- 
ings in the two-stage process, 2,082 
(34.8 per cent of claims initiated but a 
full 81.8 per cent of decisions r ended  
Refugee Claims 
at the full hearing stage) of claimants 
have been granted refugee status, 
while 655 (10.9 per cent of claims initi- 
ated) either were not eligible of lacked 
credible basis, or were not found to be 
Convention refugees by the Board. An 
additional 110 (1.8 per cent of claims 
initiated) have withdrawn of 
abandoned their claims. 
Of the 5,987 claims for refugee sta- 
tus in this quarter there were 5,820 
decisions rendered. Significantly 
enough, only 193 claims (3.3 per cent 
of decisions rendered) were rejected at 
the initial stage (10 were deemed ineli- 
gible and 183 lacked a credible basis). 
Fifty-nine others were withdrawn by 
claimants while another 108 cases am 
under short adjournments or 
postponements. 
Of the 5,627 claims moving for- 
ward to full hearings 51 were subse- 
quently abandoned or withdrawn. 
Decisions are pending in 1,828 cases, 
677 are under short adjournments or 
postponements, and 527 are scheduled 
for the coming weeks. 
The 10 claimants who were found 
to be ineligible at the initial hearing 
were from Afghanistan 4, Bangladesh 
1, Malaysia 1, Peru 1, Poland 1, 
Switzerland 1 and Thailand 1. 
The 183 claimants who were found 
not to have credible basis at the initial 
hearing were from Algeria 2, Angola 1, 
Argentina 14, Bangladesh 1, Bulgaria 
3, Chile 1, China 1, Colombia 1, Congo 
1, Costa Rica 1, Czechoslovakia 9, 
Dominica 5, Ecuador 2, Egypt 1, El 
Salvador 3, Fiji 1, France 2, Ghana 6, 
Greece 1, Grenada 7, Guatemala 3, 
Guinea 1, Guyana 3, Hong Kong 1, 
India 5, Israel 1, Jamaica 7, Kenya 6, 
Lebanon 3, Malaysia 1, Mexico 4, 
Nigeria 2, Pakistan 3, Panama 2, 
Poland 29, Portugal 1, Romania 2, 
Seychelles 1, Sri Lanka 2, St. Vincent 1, 
Sudan 2, Syria 2, Trinidad & Tobago 
11, Uganda 1, Uruguay 2, USA 6, USSR 
2, Venezuela 5, Yugoslavia 8 and not 
stated 3. 
The 2,082 claimants who were con- 
firmed at the full hearing level were 
from Afghanistan 5, Albania 1, Algeria 
2, Argentina 3, Bangladesh 8, Benin 1, 
Bulgaria 1, Chile 6, China 88, Comoros 
1, Cuba 3, Czechoslovakia 12, El 
Salvador 145, Ethiopia 46, Ghana 4, 
Guatemala 41, Guyana 1, Haiti 3, 
Honduras 10, Hungary 1, Iran 221, 
Iraq 17, Israel 1, Jordan 3, Kenya 11, 
Kuwait 1, Lebanon 296, Liberia 1, 
Libya 3, Mali 2, Mexico 1, Nicaragua 
24, Pakistan 40, Panama 2, Peru 15, 
Philippines 2, Poland 14, Portugal 1, 
Romania 10, Saudi Arabia 1, Senegal 1, 
Seychelles 6, Somalia 587, South Africa 
6, Sri Lanka 380, Sudan 26, Syria 7, 
Uganda 3, Uruguay 3, USSR 1, 
Venezuela 2, Yugoslavia 4 and Zaire 8. 
The 462 claimants who were 
denied at the full hearing level were 
from Afghanistan 1, Algeria 1, 
Apntina 2, Bangladesh 4, Bulgaria 1, 
Chile 2, China 31, Costa Rica 1, Cuba 2, 
Czechoslovakia 61, Ecuador 2, El 
Salvador 48, Ethiopia 2, Ghana 9, 
Guatemala 5, Haiti 3, Honduras 2, 
Hungary 2, India 4, Iran 18, Iraq 1, 
Jordan 2, Kenya 5, Lebanon 94, Liberia 
1, Mexico 1, Nicaragua 13, Nigeria 2, 
Pakistan 3, Panama 4, Paraguay 1, 
Peru 7, Poland 20, Romania 2, Sierra 
Leone 1, Somalia 33, South Africa 1, Sri 
Lanka 42, Sudan 5, Syria 5, Uganda 2, 
Uruguay 1, USSR 1, Vietnam 1, Yemen 
South 1, Yugoslavia 8, Zaire 3 and 
Zambia 1. 
- 
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Donors to the Centre for Refugee Studies 
Category 
Supporter 
Student Friend 
Friend 
Supporting Friend 
Patron 
Corporate Patron 
To: 
Gifts 
Subscription to Refuge. 
Invitation to all events sponsored by the Centre, 
including lectures and colloquia as well as our 
annual meeting and dinner. 
Same privileges as above. 
Both of the above plus special rates for our 
publications. 
Donation 
$25.00 
$30.00 
$60.00 
$85.00 
All of the above plus more kisses from the Director. $150.00 
All of the above plus less kisses from the Director. $650.00 
Centre for Refugee Studies 
234 A.S.B., York University 
4700 Keele Street 
North York, Ontario, Canada M 3  J 1 P3 
I wish to receive information on the following: I wish to become a: 
Seminar Series I 
Colloquia [ 1 
Publications [ I  
Supporter [ I 
Student Friend [ 1 
Friend [ I  
Supporting Friend [ 1 
Patron [ I 
Corporate Patron [ I 
My cheque, made payable to the Centre for Refugee Studies, for 
[ ]$25 [ 1$30 [ 1$60 [ 1$85 [ I$l50 [ 1$650 [ I$ 
is enclosed. 
Please send the official tax receipt to: 
Name 
Organization 
Address 
City Rovince/State 
Country Postal Code 
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CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES 
REFUGE 
ccntrsfaRsCIlgc Scudia,YodrUmwaitJ, 
Suits 234. Adminidntive Studia Building, 
4700 Ksds S a s q  Narh YO&. C)ntuio, Cam& M3J 1P3. 
T d q h a ~ ~ :  (416) m5663. Fax: (416) 73&5687. 
Elcam& M.it Vi lXtnat Addrru:RENWYORKVMl. 
Postage Paid in Toronto 
Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512 
Return Postage Guaranteed 
Refugee Policy: 
A Comparison of Canada and the USA 
~nternational Conference 
Sunday, May 27 - Wednesday, May 30,1990 
Glendon College Campus, York University 
The Centre for Refugee Studies, York University and the Refugee Policy Group, Washington DC, are convening an 
international conference to compare Canadian and US refugee policy. 
Those participating in the conference include academics, policy makers and representatives from non- 
governmental organizations in both the United States and Canada. Topics to be discussed will include: 
Monday May 28th: 
Session I: US And Canadian Refugee Policy: F u t u ~  Challenges 
Session II: Foundations of Canadian and US Refugee Policy 
Session 111: Foreign and Defence Policy: The Impact on Refugee Policy 
Session IV: Issues and Perspectives on Overseas Assistance 
Session V: US and Canadian Admissions Policy 
lbesday May 29th: 
Session VI: Refugee Resettlement 
Session VII: Refugee Mental Health 
Session WI: Legal Framework 
Session D<: Refugee Determination Procedures 
Wednesday May 30th: 
Presentation of Workshops 
Plenary Session (restricted to policy makers and paper writers to reflect on the results of the workshops and 
presentations) 
Also on Wednesday at the main campus of York University 
A Bridging Day 
A practical, hands on, all day session for those interested in learning to shelve and computerize documents. 
Guest speakers will discuss a variety of topics, from "The Importance of Sharing Information: How to Start" to "Breaking 
out of the Mystery of Computers: How to Do." 
For further information about the conference please contact Ann Watson at the Centre for Refugee Studies, 234 
Administrative Studies Building, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1 P3. 
